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OPTIMAL DISCOUNTING IN CONTROL PROBLEMS THAT
SPAN MULTIPLE GENERATIONS
Frank Caliendo and Kenneth Lyon

ABSTRACT

The principal contribution of this paper is the linking together of separate control
problems across multiple generations using the bequest motive, intergenerational altruism,
rational expectations, and solution boundary conditions. We demonstrate that discounting at the
market rate of interest is an endogenous characteristic of a general equilibrium, optimal control
problem that spans multiple generations. Within the confines of our model, we prove that it is
optimal to discount at the market rate of interest the social benefits to distant generations from
immediate clean up at toxic waste sites if the current generation that bears the cleanup cost is
perfectly altruistic towards future generations. Also, we show that this result holds for
alternative assumptions regarding pure time preference. Moreover, the result holds regardless of
whether selfish interim generations attempt to undo the provisions made for distant generations.
In our distortion-free deterministic model, the evidence for intergenerational discounting at the

market rate of interest is compelling.

OPTIMAL DISCOUNTING IN CONTROL PROBLEMS THAT
SPAN MULTIPLE GENERATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION
A recent book entitled Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, published by Resources
for the Future, represents an insightful compilation of the opinions and analysis of some of the
foremost economists on the issue of discounting. The principle question being addressed is
whether long-term environmental projects can be treated the same as short-term ones, as far as
discounting is concerned. Some authors, Arrow (1999), Weitzman (1999), Bradford (1999), and
Montgomery (1999) suggest that the market rate of interest is the appropriate discount rate even
in projects that span multiple generations of time. Others, Cline (1999), Lind (1999), Schelling
(1999), and Rothenberg (1999) hold that such projects cannot be viewed in the traditional costbenefit sense.
This is a complex issue and both sets of opinions have merit. We do not presume to settle
this debate, and we do not intend to give a detailed account of all the issues raised by these
authors. Rather, our intention is to show that discounting at the market rate of interest is optimal
in a distortion-free general equilibrium, environmental control problem that spans multiple
generations of time, provided current generations are perfectly altruistic towards future
generations. This important proof provides rigorous support for the market rate of interest as the
appropriate discount rate in multi generational public projects that deal with the environment.
Lyon (1996) proved that the discounting of future benefits from natural resources at the
market rate of interest is a feature of a deterministic, general equilibrium optimal growth
program for which distortions are absent. (See Weitzman 1994 and Weitzman 1998 for the
effects of distortions and uncertainty on the social discount rate.) We extend Lyon's analysis to
a multi-generational problem and show that under certain conditions his conclusions hold: the
market rate of interest is the optimal discount rate, regardless of the time horizon.
We analyze a simple growth model where toxic waste sites affect the health and therefore
the productivity of the work force, and waste can be removed in accordance with social cleanup
expenditure. Waste removal generates good health and therefore additional income from
increased productivity of workers. We consider separate, single generation continuous time
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control problems with these features and we link these problems together (end-to-end) using the
bequest motive, intergenerational altruism, rational expectations, and solution endpoint
conditions. The result is an intergenerational control problem.
Section 2 analyzes two generations of time and shows that if the current generation is
perfectly altruistic and has rational expectations of the behavior of the next generation,
the separate control problems collapse to a single intergenerational control problem of
twice the length in which future benefits are discounted at the market rate of interest.
Section 3 shows that this result holds even for alternative assumptions regarding the rate
of pure time preference. And, in Section 4 we consider three generations of time in
which the middle generation is selfish and does not care about the level of toxic waste left
for the last generation. Further, the middle generation may undo the cleanup efforts made
by the first generation. Even so, the control model indicates that generation 1 will
discount any income benefits accruing to generation 3 at the market rate of interest.
Section 5 offers concluding remarks.

2. A MULTI-GENERATIONAL PROBLEM: TOXIC WASTE CLEANUP
The model economy produces income y (t) according to the following concave,
continuously differentiable production function
y(t)

=

J(k(t), h( wet»~)

where k(t) is the stock of capital, and h( w(t» is the level of human health which is a
function of the amount of toxic waste at a disposal site, wet). We assume that toxic waste
negatively affects human health, which in tum negatively affects the productivity of the
workforce. All other factors used in the production of income are omitted for simplicity,
and the same is true for other variables that affect health.
Society spends income on a consumption commodity, new capital, and waste removal:
e(t) is consumption spending, z(t) is aggregate gross investment, and get) is expenditure

on waste removal. Thus,
yet)

=

J(k(t), h( w(t»)

=

e(t) + z(t) + get)

We assume the unit price of each of these items is one (and there is no inflation in the
model). Thus, e(t), z(t) , and get) also can be interpreted as quantities purchased at time t.
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Capital and toxic waste are the state variables in this control problem. Capital
accumulates according to
dk(t)
dt

= z(t) - 8 k(t)

which can be rewritten as
(1)

dk(t)

-- =

dt

J(k(t) , h( w(t ))) - e(t) - get) - 8 k(t)

where 8 is the rate of capital depreciation.
For simplicity the level of waste is reduced only according to cleanup expenditure
(there is no biological depreciation of the waste - this assumption does not affect the
results). Also, waste is no longer being produced. Imagine a toxic waste site that was
once an area for active dumping, but that is now abandoned.
(2)

dw(t) = -get)
dt

Finally, society receives utility from consumption U(e(t)). This function is strictly
concave and continuously differentiable. Of course, utility probably is also a function of
health. The implications of this assumption are explored in a related working paper
(Caliendo and Lyon 2003). To focus solely on the intergenerational dynamics we have
chosen to model social utility as a function of consumption only.
Consider two periods of time: period 1 is [0, 1] and period 2 is [T, 21]. There are two
groups of people, those that exist on [0, 1], which we refer to as generation 1, and those
that exist on [T, 21], which we refer to as generation 2. These generations do not
overlap, they exist end-to-end. This assumption simplifies the mathematical modeL
Also, the generations do not need to be the same size, but for convenience they are.
Suppose a social planner initially operates the economy optimally on [0,1], which
along with other things means that k(I) and w(I) are chosen to maximize the lifetime
utility of generation 1. Next the social planner maximizes the lifetime utility of
generation 2, given k(I) and w(I) as initial conditions. Generation 2 is endowed with
capital and waste according to the bequest of these stock variables by generation 1. Thus,

k(I) and w( I) are the bequeathed stocks or solution endpoints from stage 1, and also the
initial conditions for a new control problem starting at time T and finishing at 2T.
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The first stage of the multi-generational problem is
max:

T

fo

exp[-pt]U(e(t»dt + exp[-pT]B(k(T), weT»~

subject to equations (1) and (2) where k(O) and w(O) are given and e(t) and get) are the
control variables. The exponential function is the subjective discount factor, which
decreases annually at the rate of pure time preference, p. B is a strictly concave bequest
function that measures the utility received by generation 1 from endowing generation 2
with k(T) and w(T) . B is increasing in k(1) and decreasing in w(T).
The second stage is
max:

2T

fT

exp[-p(t - T)]U(e(t»dt + exp[-p(2T - T)]B(k(2T) , w(2T»

subject to equations (1) and (2) where the initial conditions k(T) and w(T) are given.
They are the solution endpoints to the first stage of the control problem. We assume the
utility and bequest functions are the same for both generations, and that both generations
are equally impatient about the time profile of their own utility (i.e., p is the same in
both stages).
A number of authors (Cline 1999, Schelling 1999, Rothenberg 1999, and Toman 1999
to name a few) argue that pure time preference is an intra-generational phenomenon that
should not be applied to inter-generational problems. One interpretation of this statement
would be to not discount the bequest functions at the rate of time preference. We explore
this alternative in the next section.
For notational clarity, and for reasons that will become apparent, the costate variables
for stage 1 carry a "1" subscript and the costate variables for stage 2 carry a "2" subscript.
The current value Hamiltonian function for stage 1 is
H (e(t), g(t), k(t), w(t), AI (t), 171 (t» = U( e(t» + AI (t){f(k(t), h( wet»~) - e(t)
- g(t) - 8 k(t)} - 171 (t)g(t)
where AI (t) and 171 (t) are the current value costate variables in stage 1 associated with
capital and waste, respectively.
The current value Hamiltonian function for stage 2 is
H (e(t), g(t), k(t), wet), A2 (t), 172(t» = U (e(t» + A2 (t){f(k(t), h( wet»~) - e(t)
- get) - 8 k(t)} - 172(t)g(t)
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where A2(t) and rh (t) are the current value costate variables in stage 2 associated with
capital and waste, respectively.
Thus, Ai (t) is the value (at time t) to generation i of a unit of capital at time t, and
l7; (t) is the value (at time t) to generation i of a unit of waste at time t. (Detailed

discussion of the costate variable can be found in Kamien and Schwartz 1991, Hoy et al.
1996, and Lyon 1999). l7i (t) is negative because waste impairs worker productivity, and
-l7; (t) can be viewed as the value of a unit of waste removal at time t.

The following are first order necessary conditions in current value form that hold for
both control problems (i.e., these conditions hold for generation 1 on [0, T] and for
generation 2 on [T, 2T], only the initial conditions and transversality conditions differ
from one problem to the next)
8U(C *(t))_A*(t)

(3a)

8c(t)

(3b)
(3c)

(3d)

1

- A; (t) -l7i* (t)
dA; (t)
dt

°
=°
=

i=1,2

i

= 1,2

= ~~ (t)_{8f(k * (t)' h(W* (t))) -8}A~(t)
P

8k(t)

1

i=I , 2

1

dl7I*(t) =
~ (t)- 1 ~ (t) 8f(k * (t) , h(w* (t))) 8h(w* (t))
dt
Pl7l
/[,1
8h( wet))
Ow(t)

i = 1, 2

Asterisks denote optimal values. We assume that non-negativity constraints on the
control and state variables are automatically satisfied. The transversality conditions for
stage 1 are
A* (T)
1

= 8B(k* (T), w* (T))
8k(T)

* (T) = 8B(k*(T), w * (T))
Ow(T)

l71

and for stage 2
A* (2T)
2

* (2T)
l72

= 8B(k* (2T), w * (2T))
8k(2T)

= 8B(k* (2T), w* (2T))
Ow(2T)
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The market rate of interest is defined as
r(t) == Bf(k * (t), h( w * (t))) _ 5
Bk(t)

which follows naturally from Euler's theorem if the production function is homogeneous
of degree one and if factor markets are competitive. Moreover, the implicit user cost of
capital gives the same definition for the interest rate under certain conditions which can
be expected to hold in this model. And it is worth mentioning that ret) is the own rate of
interest of an additional unit of capital at time t, which is seen by differentiating equation
(1) with respect to k(t).
We define a as a parameter that measures the intergenerational altruism of generation
1 towards generation 2. a measures how much generation 1 cares for the welfare of
generation 2 relative to how much generation 2 cares for their own welfare. Let

a

E

[0,1]. If a = 1, then generation 1 cares exactly as much for generation 2 as

generation 2 cares for themselves; if a = 0, generation 1 cares nothing for the welfare of
generation 2. Defining intergenerational altruism in this manner (which essentially is
taken from Kennedy and Welling 1997) implies a bequest function for generation 1 with
the following characteristics
BB(k(T), weT)) == a A* (T)
Bk(T)
2
BB(k(T), weT)) ==
Bw(T)

a

* (T)

772

The second equation, for example, indicates that the marginal value to generation 1 of
endowing generation 2 with an extra unit of waste is defined asa times the marginal
value of that endowment to generation 2. This follows from the fact that at the beginning
of stage 2, the solution costate variables for the second generation control problem are
A; (T) and

77; (T) , which represent the value that the second generation places on

inheriting an extra unit of capital and waste, respectively, given k(I) and w(I). Implicit
in this definition of the bequest function is the rational expectation on the part of
generation 1 that generation 2 will dispose of the endowed waste in an optimal manner;
this provides justification for evaluating the costate variables on the right hand side of the
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above identities at their optimal values. Evaluated along the optimal path for generation
1 we have
8B(k * (T) , w* (T)) ==
8k(T)

a A* (T)
2

8B(k *(T) , w * (T)) == a

aw(T)

* (T)

7h

In what follows, we assume a = 1, not only because this assumption is reasonable, but

also because we are interested in analyzing optimal discounting in a multi-generational
problem that is marked by perfect intergenerational altruism.

This seems to be a

popular theme - the current generation ought to plan for future generations as if they
cared as much for future generations as future generations care for themselves. Thus,
generation l' s bequest function has the characteristics
8B(k * (T), w * (T)) ==A* (T)
8k(T)
2
8B(k *(T), w*(T)) == * (T)

aw_
( T)

Th

This convenient definition of the partial derivatives of the bequest function allows us
to write the costate variables in a form that spans multiple generations, and, therefore,
provides for a discussion of intergenerational discounting.
Some readers may feel that perfect intergenerational altruism also implies that the
bequest function should not be discounted at the rate of time preference. We do not
necessarily disagree, but we show in Section 3 that the results of this paper are
independent of whether or not the bequest function is discounted at the rate of time
preference. This result, of course, strengthens the conclusions of this paper.
Equations (3c) and (3d) are linear differential equations (see, e.g. , Simon and Blume
1994 for the general solutions to such differential equations). It is important to note that
while the differential equations that govern the movement of the costate variables are the
same in both generations, the particular solutions are not the same. Particular solutions,
of course, depend on boundary conditions which may differ

fro~

one generation to the
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next. The particular solutions to the boundary value problelTIs from the two periods of
time are (see Appendix A for derivations)

rT

'J *()
8B(k * (T) ,w* (T))
t =
exp[p( t - T) + Jt r ()d]
s s

(4)

/l.)

8k(T)

t

2T
'J * ()
8B(k * (2T), w * (2T))
t =
exp[p( t - 2T) + Jlr r ( s )ds ]

(5)

/l.)

-

* (0)
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8k(2T)

= 8B(k * (T), w* (T)) ex [_
p

aw(T)

(6)

+

T]

p

rT ..1,* (t) 8f(k * (t),h(w* (t))) 8h(w* (t)) ex

Jo
* (T)
772

t

8h(w(t))

1

= 8B(k* (2T), w* (2T)) ex [_
p

aw(2T)

(7)

+

f2T
T

aw(t)

[- t]dt
p

p

(2T - T)]

p

..1,* (t) 8f(k * (t), h( w* (t))) 8h( w * (t)) ex [_ (t _ T)]dt
2
8h(w(t))
aw(t)
p P

Using our definition of perfect altruism, together with equation (7), we have
(8)
8B(k * (T) , w* (T)) == * (T) = 8B(k * (2T), w* (2T)) ex [_ (2T _ T)]
aw(T)
772
aw(2T)
p P

+

f2T ..1,* (t) 8f(k * (t),h(w* (t))) 8h(w* (t)) ex
T

2

8h(w(t))

aw(t)

p

[- (t-T)]dt
P

Inserting equation (8) into equation (6) gives an intergenerational version of the costate
variable
7 * (0)

71

( 9)

= {aB(k* (2T), w* (2T))

aw(2T)

+
+

f2T
T

ex [- (2T - T)]
p

P

'J * ()af(k
*(t),h(w*(t)))ah(w* (t)) exp [ - p ( t - T)]d}
t
t exp [ - p T]
ah( w(t))
aw(t)

A )

rT A,* (t) af(k * (t) ,h(w' (t))) ah(w* (t)) ex
Jo

1

ah(w(t))

aw(t)

[- t]dt
P P

Equation (9) is the value to generation 1 of an additional unit of waste cleanup at time
zero. We note that this value includes separate components for the additional income
generated during the separate phases of the intergenerational problem.
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It is useful to rewrite equations (4) an (5) by expressing the partial derivatives of the

bequest function in tenns of the initial values of the costate variables. Evaluate equation
(4) at time zero, solve for 8B(k * (T), w * (T» / 8k(T) , and insert back into equation (4) to
obtain on [0, TJ

A; (I) =A;(o)eXP[PI -

(4')

.br(S)dsJ

Similarly, evaluate equation (5) at time T, solve for 8B(k * (2T), w* (2T» / 8k(2T) , and
insert back into equation (5) to obtain on [T, 2TJ
(5')
Use the transversality condition from stage 1 along with the definition of perfect
altruism to note that
,,1,* (T) = 8B(k* (T), w * (T» == ,,1,* (T)
1
8k(T)
2

Thus, equation (5') can be written as
(10)
We can evaluate equation (4 ') at time T and insert into equation (10) to obtain

A;(I) = A; (o)eXP[PT - S: r(S)dsJ exp[p(1 - T) - S>(S)dsJ
which reduces to
(11 )
Equations (4'), (9), and (11) jointly ensure that, at the optimum, future income
benefits accruing to generations 1 and 2 that result from a unit of waste reduction at time
zero will be discounted at the market rate of interest. This is seen by inserting equations
(4') and (11) into equation (9) to obtain

10
*

aB(k * (2T), w* (2T))

,

8w(2T)

17 (0) =

exp[-p(2T - T)]exp[-pT]

it r(s)ds Ja-r(k * (t),h(w* (t)))ah( w* (t)) exp[-p(t-T)]dtexp[-pT]
ah(w(t))
aw(t)
+
i A (O)exp pt - it r(s)ds Ja-r(k (t) hew (t))) ah(w' (t)) exp[-pt]dt
+

2T

f

*

T

T

[

A (O)exp pt-

'J

'

0

*

[

*

'J

o '

*

,

ah( wet))

0

aw(t)

which reduces to
* (0) =

17,

(12)

BB(k · (2T), w* (2T)) ex [_ 2T]
aw(2T)
p p

+

f

2T

T

rT

[rt ( )d

Jat ( k * (t), h( w * (t))) ah( w * (t)) d

exp - J( r s s t
ah(w(t))

0

[

rt ( )d

8w(t)

Jat ( k * (t), h( w * (t))) ah( w * (t)) d

+ J( exp - J( r s s t

o

Bh(w(t))

0

aw(t)

A;(0) has been nonnalized to one (we normalize the units of the utility function

where

such that the marginal utility of consumption at time zero equals one, see equation 3a).
Equation (12) shows the intended result. Future income benefits that result from
immediate removal of toxic waste are discounted at the market rate of interest on an
optimal growth path, irrespective of the time at which the income benefits are received.
Thus, whether the benefits accnle to current generations or to future generations, the
optimal discount rate in this model is the market rate of interest.
Furthennore, the tenns of equation (12) can be combined to obtain
* (0)

17,

= aB(k* (2T), w* (2T)) ex [_

2T]

P P

8w(2T)

r2T exp[rt
( )d Jat ( k * (t) , h ( w • (t))) ah ( w· (t)) d
- J( r s s t

+ JI

o

0

ah( wet))

8w(t)

where it is clear that the value of a unit of a waste removal at time zero includes the
discounted value of the future income stream across the entire multi-generational
planning interval [0, 21]. That is, ifintergenerational altruism is perfect, then the multigenerational planning problem collapses to a single control problem with twice the
length, and the market rate of interest is the optimal discount rate.

3. NON-DISCOUNTED BEQUEST FUNCTION
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Some readers may feel that not discounting the bequest functions better represents
perfect intergenerational altruism. This issue is examined below. We demonstrate that
the conclusions in the previous section hold even if the bequest functions are not
discounted at the rate of time preference in the objective functional.
In this case, all the first order necessary conditions remain the same, except for the
transversality conditions, which become
ex [_ T]A*(T)=8B(k *(T),w* (T))
p p /.,
8k(T)
ex [_ T]

P

* (T)

= 8B(k* (T), w* (T))

ry1

P

8w(T)

for stage 1, and for stage 2
ex [- (2T _ T)]A,* (2T)
p P
2

= 8B(k * (2T), w* (2T))

ex [- (2T _ T)] * (2T)
P P
ry2

= 8B(k* (2T), w* (2T))

8k(2T)

8w(2T)

The left sides of each of the transversality conditions are present value costate
variables. It is standard that the present value costate variables, by definition, equal the
partial derivatives of the bequest function when this function is not discounted at the rate
of time preference.
These new transversality conditions alter the particular solutions. The analogue to
equation (6) is
(13)

* (0) = 8B(k * (T), w* (T))

ry]

+

rT A,* (t) 8f(k* (t), h(w* (t))) 8h(w* (t)) ex

Jo

aw(T)

I

8h(w(t))

aw(t)

[_ t]dt
P

p

The analogue to equation (8) is
(14)
8B(k* (T), w* (T)) == * (T) = 8B(k* (2T), w* (2T))
aw(T)
ry2
aw(2T)

+

f2T
T

Insert (14) into (13) to obtain

A,* (t) 8f(k* (t), h( w * (t))) 8h( w * (t))
2

8h(w(t))

aw(t)

ex [_ (t - T)]dt
p

P

12
"(0)

(15)

1],

f2T

= oB(k * (2T), w· (2T)) +
ow(2T)

+

T

1* ( )
/L )

t

of(k* (t) , h(w* (t))) oh(w* (t))
oh( w(t))

-

aw(t)

rT A*(t)of(k*(t),h(w*(t))) oh(w*(t)) ex
Jo'

oh( wet))

aw(t)

[ ( T) ]d
exp - p t t

[_ t]dt
p

p

The analogues to equations (4) and (5) are
"

X (t)

(16)

1

1* ()

(17)

/L )

-

t

oB(k* (T), w* (T»
[
T
]
exp p t +
r(s)ds
ok(T)
Jt

r

= oB(k * (2T), w* (2T» exp[p( t ok(2T)

T) +

12T r (s )ds ]
t

Following the method in the last section for transforming equations (4) and (5) into (4')
and (5'), equations (16) and (17) also can be transformed identically into (4') and (5').
Thus, equations (4') and (5') hold whether the bequest functions are or are not discounted
at the rate of time preference.
The transversality condition and the definition of perfect altruism imply
ex [- T]J*(T) = oB(k *(T),w*(T)) =A* (T)

P P

ok(T)

/'1

2

Using this together with equation (5')
/l; (t) = exp[ - pTJ/l; (T) exp[p( t - T) - ,r(S)ds]
which can be rewritten using equation (4') evaluated at time T as
/l; (t) = exp[ -pTJil; (o)exp[p T - f: r(s)ds }xp[p(t - T) - f;r(S)dsJ
This reduces to
/l; (t) = ;.,; (0) exp[p( t - T) -

(18)

f~ r(s )ds ]

Insert equations (18) and (4') into equation (15) to obtain
* (0)

(19)

= oB(k · (2T) , w· (2T)) +
ow(2T)

1],

rT

f2T ex
T

[_ rtr(S)dS] of(k' (t),h(w* (t))) oh(w* (t)) dt
P Jo
oh(w(t))
ow(t)

[ r' ( )d ] of(k* (t),h(w· (t)) oh(w* (t») d

+ J( exp - J( r s s t

o

0

oh(w(t))

ow(t)

where A~ (0) has been normalized to one. Equation (19) shows that future income
benefits from waste cleanup that accnle to future generations still are discounted at the
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market rate of interest on the optimal path even if the bequest function is not discounted
at the rate of time preference in the objective functional.

4. SELFISH INTERIM GENERATIONS
A common concern with discounting future benefits in projects that span multiple
generations is the potential behavior of interim generations that could undo the provisions
that are intended for the welfare of distant future generations. This section analyzes a
related issue.
We expand the analysis of Section 2 to include a third generation. To achieve this we
include the necessary conditions for the third generation, and by modifying equation (3b)
as discussed below. Generation 3 Generation 3 exists on [2T, 31]. We assume that each
generation is perfectly altruistic towards the next generation in terms of the capital
bequest. That is, generation i values the act of endowing generation i +1 with capital
exactly the same as generation i + 1 values receiving the capital endowment. However,
we assume that only generations 1 and 3 are altruistic in terms of the bequest of toxic
waste. Generation 2 is selfish and completely indifferent when it comes to preserving the
environment for future generations. Generation 2 still may allocate funds to waste
cleanup, but only to improve their own health.
Our motivation for considering this type of scenario comes from the idea that tastes
for a clean environment may not be constant. Therefore, how should generation 1
discount the benefits from immediate waste cleanup that accrue to generation 3, provided
that generation 2 is not concerned with reducing the amount of waste that generation 3
will inherit? Further, generation 2 may react to a smaller waste endowment from
generation 1 by reducing their own cleanup expenditure on [T, 21], effectively undoing
the cleanup efforts of generation 1. How does this affect intergenerational discounting?
Importantly, we demonstrate that the answers to these interesting questions are consistent
with the thrust of this paper: it is optimal for generation 1 to discount the future income
benefits to that accrue to generation 3 at the market rate of interest, even if generation 2 is
completely selfish.
Using the transversality conditions from the Section 2 together with the ideas
mentioned in the above paragraphs, we have
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,,1*(T) = 8B(k * (T),w* (T)) ==,,1* (T)
1
8k(T)
2
,,1* (2T)
2

=

8B(k * (2T)) == ,,1* (2T)
8k(2T)
3

Thus, with respect to capital, generation 1 is altruistic towards generation 2, who in tum
is altnlistic towards generation 3. However, this link of altruism does not hold with
respect to waste removal. Instead, we consider a case where generation 1 is perfectly
altruistic towards both the remaining generations, and generation 2 cares only for
themselves
*(T)= 8B(k *(T),w*(T)) == *(T)+ex [_ (2T -T)] *(2T)aw*(2T)
171
aw(T)
172
p P
rh
aw* (T)
* (2T) =

712

8B(k * (2T)) == 0
aw(2T)

The marginal value (which is negative) that generation 1 places on the bequest of one
extra unit of waste at time T is composed of the combined cost to generations 2 and 3.
The partial derivative aw* (2T) / aw* (T) captures the change in the amount of waste that
generation 2 bequeaths to generation 3, as a result of an incremental change in generation
2' s endowment of waste. We have also explored different possibilities for the manner in
which perfect altruism is defined with respect to pure time preference. In Appendix B we
extend the analysis of Section 3 where the bequest function is not discounted, as this may
be more in line with "perfect" altruism.

Importantly, the results of this section hold

identically in either case.
The general solution to the differential equation for waste accumulation is
w * (t) = C -

r

g " (s )ds

where C is a constant. Evaluate at time T, solve for C and substitute to obtain on [T, 21]

Evaluate at the end of generation 2, t = 2T, and differentiate
aw* (2T) = 1- f2T 8g * (t) dt
aw* (T)
T aw* (T)
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If generation 1 endows generation 2 with an extra unit of waste, generation 2 will respond
by endowing generation 3 with an extra unit, net of the change in their own waste
removal spending on [T, 21].
Thus, we can rewrite the altruism condition as
(20)

f2T

* (T) = 8B(k * (T) , w* (T)) == * (T) + ex [_ (2T _ T)] * (2T){I8g * (t) dt}
aw(T)
'72
p P
'73
T aw* (T)

7JI

In the previous sections, we assumed that non-negativity constraints on the control and
state variables were automatically satisfied. However, because generation 2 is selfish, we
must explicitly account for a non-negativity constraint on waste removal in that
generation. At time 2T , the selfish second generation has the incentive to chose
infinitely negative waste removal, which essentially means that income would be
infinitely positive at time 2T. Infinite income would be divided between consumption
and gross investment, which implies that the value of the marginal capital endowment to
generation 3 is zero. That is, generation 3 would be endowed with infinite capital, which
consequently is worthless at the margin. Without a non-negative constraint on waste
removal, this unrealistic scenario would be perfectly consistent with the first of necessary
conditions of the problem.
Accounting for the non-negativity of get) in generation 2 consists of altering equation
(3b) to include the non-negative multiplier J.1(t)

and the complementary slackness condition

J.1 *(t)w* (t) = 0
The non-negativity constraint will bind at time 2T and possibly before that time
depending on the returns to health in the production of national income. That is, if the
returns to good health are low relative to the cost of waste removal, the constraint will
bind.
Generation 3 values an additional initial unit of waste according to
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(21 )

• (2T) = BB(k ' (3T), w " (3T» ex [_ (3T - 2T)]
'h
Bw(3T)
p P

+ f3T ;{*(t) Bf(k* (t) , h(w*(t») Bh(w*(t)) ex [_ (t -2T )]dt
2T 3
Bh(w(t»
aw(t)
P P
Thus, using (20), (21), and equation (7) with BE(k * (2T») / 8w(2T) == 0, we can write the
value of waste to generation 1 at time zero as (i.e., rewrite equation 6)
* (0) =

TJI

{BB(k ' (3T), w' (3T» ex [_ 3T]
aw(3T)
P P

+ f 3T A*(t) Bf(k *(t), hew' (t») Bh( w* (t» ex [_ t] dt} *
2T

(22)

8h(w(t»

3

aw(t)

P

P

{1-

f2T Bg * (t) dt}
T 8w' (T)

+ f 2T A* (t) Bf(k*(t),h(w*(t») 8h(w*(t» ex [- t]dt
T

+

Bh(w(t»

2

aw(t)

rTA*(t) af(k* (t), hew' (t») 8h(w* (t»
Jo

Bh(w(t»

I

aw(t)

P

P

ex [_ t]dt
P P

The costate variable for physical capital during generation 3 is
A; (I)

=,1,;(2T)ex p [pCt - 2T) - f~Tr(s)dS]

which can be rewritten using the intergeneration altruism with respect to generation 2's
capital bequest

Evaluate equation (11) at t = 2T and insert into equation (23)
(24)
Insert equations (4 '), (11), and (24) into equation (22) and normalize A; (0) == 1 to obtain
* (0)

TJI

= BB(k ' (3T), w· (3T» * {l- f2T 8g* (t) dt} ex [- 3T]
aw(3T)

+ f3T ex [_
2T

P

T 8w· (T)

P

P

rt r(S)dS ] af(k* (t),h( w* (t») 8h(w' (t»
Jo

ah(w(t»

8w(t)

{1-

2T
[rt ( )d ] 8f (k * (t), h ( w * (t») 8h ( w • (t» d
+ f
exp - J( r s s t
T
0
8h(w(t»
aw(t)

+ loT exp [- lot r(S)ds] 8f(k*(t),h(w*(t») ah(w*(t» dt
8h(w(t»

aw(t)

f 2T agO (t) dt}dt
Taw' (T)
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Thus, the value to generation 1 of an additional unit of waste removal at time zero
includes the discounted stream of income to generation 3 from good health. Even though
the gains to generation 3 may be small, due to a selfish interim generation that may
respond to their own initial endowment at time T by reducing waste removal spending on
[T, 21] , these benefits are still discounted at the market rate of interest at the optimum.

Again, see Appendix B for a derivation of the same conclusion under an alternative
interpretation of perfect altnlism (i.e. , no intergenerational pure time preference).

5. CONCLUSION
This paper supports the discounting of income benefits at the market rate of interest in
projects (like waste relTIoval) that span multiple generations. To strengthen this
conclusion, we have examined various scenarios involving pure time preference and
selfish interim generations.
It is well documented that many economists are strongly against the use of positive

pure time preference in intergenerational projects. Thus, we have considered the issue of
waste removal under the cases where pure time preference does and does not exist across
generations. We find that in either case, the market rate of interest is the optimal discount
rate for future income benefits that result from immediate cleanup of toxic waste.
Finally, a common concern in intergenerational planning is the potential for selfish
behavior of future generations that may undo environmental provisions made by the
current generation, effectively reducing the benefits that are received by generations
beyond the selfish generation. While we have not considered all the related possibilities,
we do find that even if a selfish interim generation does not care about the amount of
waste they leave behind, it is still optimal for an altruistic current generation to discount
at the market rate if interest those benefits received by generations beyond the selfish
generation. This result holds even if the selfish generation responds to a smaller initial
endowment of waste by reducing their cleanup efforts.

APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF PARTICULAR SOLUTIONS
Equation (3c) has the general solution
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(AI)
where C is an arbitrary constant. Evaluate (A 1) at i = 1 and t = T , solve for C, and insert
back into (AI) to obtain

Use the transversality condition to find A,* (T) , which gives equation (4).
To find equation (5), evaluate equation (AI) at i = 2 and

t = 2T ,

solve for C, and

insert back into (A I) to obtain
4; (t)

=A; (2T)

exp[p (t - 2T) + L2T r(S)dS]

and use the transversality condition to find A; (2T) .
Equation (3d) has the general solution
77 .*()
t = {D

(A2)

I

-

ft

1*(S ) Bf(k *(s) , h(w*(s») Bh(w*(s» exp [- p s ]d}
s exp [P]
t
Bh(w(s»
awes)

/l,

I

where D is a constant of integration. To find equation (6), evaluate equation (A2) at
i

= 1 and t = T , solve for D, insert back into equation (A2) to obtain

and evaluate at t = 0 and use the transversality condition to obtain equation (6). To find
equation (7), evaluate equation (A2) at i = 2 and

t

= 2T , solve for D, and insert into (A2)

to obtain
77; (t)

=

77~ (2T)exp[- p(2T - t)]+
-

i

2T

t

A~ (s) Bf(k* (s),h(w* (s)))
-

Bh(w(s)

Bh(w* (s) exp[- pes - t)]ds
awes)

Use the transversality condition and evaluate at t = T.

APPENDIX B. ALTERNATIVE TO SECTION 4
Here we rework Section 4, but with non-discounted bequest functions as in Section 3,
and with the assumption that generation I cares for generations 2 and 3 exactly alike
(without pure time preference). Thus,
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ex [- T]A* (T) = 8B(k * (T) , w * (T)) == A* (T)

P

P

8k(T)

1

2

ex [- (2T - T)]A* (2T) = 8B(k * (2T)) == A* (2T)

P P

8k(2T)

2

3

ex [_ T] * (T) = 8B(k * (T) , w* (T)) == * (T) + * (2T) 8w· (2T)
P P rJ)
aw(T)
rJ 2
113
aw* (T)
ex [- (2T - T)] • (2T)
P P
rJ 2

= 8B(k * (2T))

aw(2T)

== 0

Note that generation 1 values their bequest of waste to the second and third generations
exactly as much as those latter two generations collectively value a unit of waste, and
there is no pure time preference in this relationship (that is, the value to generation 3 of a
unit of waste removal at time T, rJ; (2T) 8w* (2T) / aw* (T), is not discounted back to time

T as in Section 4).
As in Section 4,
aw* (2T) = 1- f2T 8g · (t) dt
aw* (T)
T aw* (T)

Thus,
(B1)

ex [- T] * (T)
p P rJ)

= 8B(k · (T) , w* (T))

aw(T)

==

* (T)

rJ2

+

* (2T){1 - f2T 8g · (t) dt}
T aw* (T)

rJ3

Generation 3 values an additional initial unit of waste according to
(B2)
* (2T)

713

= 8B(k * (3T), w * (3T)) +
8w(3T)

f3T A,* (t) 8f(k * (t) ,h(w· (t))) 8h(w* (t)) ex
2T

3

8h( wet))

8w(t)

[p

(t - 2T)]dt
P

Thus, using (B1), (B2), and the right hand side of equation (14) with
8B(k * (2T)) / aw(2T)

= 0, we can write the value of waste to generation 1 at time zero as

(i.e., rewrite equation 13)
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(B3)
* (0) =

771

{aB(k' (3T), w* (3T))
aw(3T)

+ f3T "l* (t) af(k* (t), hew' (t))) ah(w' (t)) ex [_ (t _ 2T)] dt} *
2T 3
ah(w(t))
aw(t)
P P

{I _

f2T ag * (t) dt}
T aw* (T)

+f2T "l* (t) af(k* (t),h(w* (t))) ah(w* (t)) ex [- (t-T)]dt
T

+

T

Io

ah(w(t))

2

'1* (
/L

1

t

)

P P

aw(t)

af(k* (t), hew· (t))) ah(w* (t))
[
]d
exp - P t t
ah(w(t))
aw(t)

As in previous sections

which can be rewritten using the definition of intergeneration altruism with respect to
generation 2' s capital bequest

(B4)

A; (t) = exp[ - p(2T - T) JA; (2 T) exp [ p( t - 2T) -

f~T r( s )ds ]

Insert equation (18) evaluated at t = 2T to obtain

A; (t) = A; (0) exp[p( t -

(BS)

2T) -

f~ r(S)dS]

Insert equations (4'), (18), and (BS) into equation (B3) and normalize A; (0) == 1 to obtain
* (0) =

771

aB(k * (3T), w * (3T))
aw(3T)

* {I _

f2T ag* (t) dt}
T aw~ (T)

rt

+ f3T ex [_ r(s)ds] af(k * (t), hew· (t))) ah(w* (t)){l_ f2T ag * (t) dt} dt
2T
P Jo
ah(w(t))
aw(t)
T aw* (T)

+ f2T ex [_ rt r(s)ds] af(k*(t),h(w*(t))) ah(w*(t)) dt
T
P Jo
ah( w(t))
aw(t)

+ loT exp [- lot r(S)ds] af(k* (t),h(w* (t))) ah(w* (t)) dt
ah( wet))

aw(t)
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ABSTRACT
The principal contribution of this paper is the linking together of separate control
problems across multiple generations using the bequest motive, intergenerational
altruism, rational expectations, and solution boundary conditions. We demonstrate that
discounting at the market rate of interest is an endogenous characteristic of a general
equilibrium, optimal control problem that spans multiple generations. Within the
confines of our model, we prove that it is optimal to discount at the market rate of interest
the social benefits to distant generations from immediate clean up at toxic waste sites if
the current generation that bears the cleanup cost is perfectly altruistic towards future
generations. Also, we show that this result holds for alternative assumptions regarding
pure time preference. Moreover, the result holds regardless of whether selfish interim
generations attempt to undo the provisions made for distant generations. In our
distortion-free detenninistic model, the evidence for intergenerational discounting at the
market rate of interest is compelling.
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1. INTRODUCTION
A recent book entitled Discounting and Intergenerational Equity, published by
Resources for the Future, represents an insightful compilation of the opinions and
analysis of some of the foremost economists on the issue of discounting. The principle
question being addressed is whether long-term environmental projects can be treated the
same as short-term ones, as far as discounting is concerned. Some authors, Arrow
(1999), Weitzman (1999), Bradford (1999), and Montgomery (1999) suggest that the
market rate of interest is the appropriate discount rate even in projects that span multiple
generations of time. Others, Cline (1999), Lind (1999), Schelling (1999), and
Rothenberg (1999) hold that such projects cannot be viewed in the traditional cost-benefit
sense.
This is a complex issue and both sets of opinions have merit. We do not presume to
settle this debate, and we do not intend to give a detailed account of all the issues raised
by these authors. Rather, our intention is to show that discounting at the market rate of
interest is optimal in a distortion-free general equilibrium, environmental control problem
that spans multiple generations of time, provided current generations are perfectly
altruistic towards future generations. This important proof provides rigorous support for
the market rate of interest as the appropriate discount rate in multi generational public
projects that deal with the environment.
Lyon (1996) proved that the discounting of future benefits from natural resources at
the market rate of interest is a feature of a deterministic, general equilibrium optima]
growth program for which distortions are absent. (See Weitzman 1994 and Weitzman
1998 for the effects of distortions and uncertainty on the social discount rate). We extend
Lyon's analysis to a multi-generational problem and show that under certain conditions
his conclusions hold: the market rate of interest is the optimal discount rate, regardless of
the time horizon.
We analyze a simple growth model where toxic waste sites affect the health and
therefore the productivity of the workforce, and waste can be removed in accordance with
social cleanup expenditure. Waste removal generates good health and therefore
additional income from increased productivity of workers. We consider separate, single
generation continuous time control problems with these features and we link these
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problems together (end-to-end) using the bequest motive, intergenerational altruism,
rational expectations, and solution endpoint conditions. The result is an intergenerational
control problem.

